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Christian De Cock
The article considers the discourse surrounding culture change programmes in two
British manufacturing organisations. The analysis of organisational discourse is pursued
as a means of revealing the indeterminacy of organisational experiences and the pro-
blems inherent to the introduction of generic change approaches such as TQM (Total
Quality Management) and BPR (Business Process Reengineering). An examination of
the discourse used in the case companies will show an intricate set of structural, cultu-
ral, economic, and personal pressures passing through the TQM/BPR concepts.
Organisational actors from all hierarchical levels are shown to be “disciplined” by the
change discourse to various degrees. Three discursive movements are examined: the
imposition/ introduction of a hegemonic discourse, the resistance to this discourse, and
the appropriation of the discourse by line managers to reconstitute their actions and
those of senior management. The outcome of these movements is a contested set of
stories, full of contradiction and ambiguity. If the change discourse is to be embodied in
local practices it cannot remain purely monologic, but has to engage in a dialogic rela-
tionship with existing and emerging concepts and meanings.
INTRODUCTION: ORGANISATIONAL
DISCOURSE AND CULTURE CHANGE
«To claim that the researcher somehow explores the real world direct-
ly, without mediation of language, and then represents, mirrors, or
translates that world into a precise word picture is today unthinkable.»
(Van Maanen, 1996, p.378).
The language we employ to describe what we take to be the facticity
of organisational life has become a focus of interest in recent years.
Organisational researchers have become increasingly sensitive to the
fact that organisational life, like any other human activity, cannot be
separated from the discursive fields of which it is an integral part
(Barrett, Thomas, and Hocevar, 1995; Hatch, 1996; Van Maanen,
1995). The idea that language has a role in the constitution of reality
has gained prevalence in a wide segment of social studies primarily as
a result of work in social construction and natural language philosophy
(Phillips and Hardy, 1997). This idea emphasises that discourses 
create ways of understanding the world, they do not mirror reality
Department of Business and Management,
School of Business and Economics,
University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4PU, UK
Telephone (School): +44 139 226 3218
Fax (Department): +44 139 226 3242
Organisational Change and Discourse:
Hegemony, Resistance and
Reconstitution
M@n@gement, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1998, 1-22
2
(Rorty, 1980). The organisational discourse perspective does not deny
that social events do have causes and social institutions effects, but
organisational actors necessarily operate in the cognitive domain,
namely a domain within which they interact with their own descriptions
(Geertz, 1980), and they cognise situations with the terms they have
available.
Discourse can be seen as a historically contingent body of regularised
practices of language that are condoned by a particular community. It
is made up of rules and procedures that construct and legitimate the
way we see things and talk about them. These practices make pos-
sible certain statements and communicational practices while disallo-
wing others (Casey, 1995). Discourse not only restricts, limits and
arranges what can and cannot be said about the phenomena within its
domain; it also empowers (and disempowers) certain agents to speak
on this or that question or fact. In many respects discourse empowers
certain agents to create representations, and thereby to authoritative-
ly pronounce on the shape and form of the world (Prior, 1997). In using
a particular discourse actors not only secure the right to speak but they
maintain or challenge power relations. Consequently, discourses
reproduce and transform power relations and are, therefore, political
processes (Phillips and Hardy, 1997).
Over the past decade, the most popular discourses1 aimed at trying to
change organisational practices have been those of Total Quality
Management (TQM) and Business Process Reengineering (BPR).
These discourses are typified by terms such as empowerment, culture
change, cross-disciplinary teams, work process flow, internal custo-
mers and continuous improvement. From an organisational discourse
perspective the TQM and BPR rhetorics can be seen as ways of
constructing realities or schemes for sensemaking (Kieser, 1997).
Through a particular change discourse (examples of this can be found
in company videos, newsletters and management presentations),
senior managers attempt to define the normative expectations of their
employees’ role. In constructing the organisation as one thing as oppo-
sed to another, certain lines of action are invited and others discoura-
ged.
The popularity of the TQM and BPR rhetoric in the practitioner orien-
tated literature has been matched by a rising scepticism in the more
academically orientated literature (e.g. Alvesson and Willmott, 1996;
Boje and Winsor, 1993), leading to accusations of faddism (e.g. Aldag,
1997; Ramsay, 1996) or, even worse, of undermining worker dignity
and efficacy (Steingard and Fitzgibbons, 1993). In this paper I am not
so much concerned with the meaning of TQM or BPR in an abstract
sense; rather I intend to capture experiences, as expressed in organi-
sational stories, resulting from the imposition of the TQM/BPR dis-
course in two case companies. In a final discussion section I will pro-
vide a grounded critique of the BPR and TQM rhetorics based on these
stories.
1. They were certainly lucrative from the
consultants’ point of view.  A senior part-
ner at Andersen Consulting is reported to
have proclaimed: «God Bless Mike
Hammer» after having estimated yearly
worldwide company revenues of $700 mil-
lion as a direct result of BPR consultancy
work (Thackray, 1993).
GROUNDING AND REPRESENTATION OF THE
RESEARCH
This study can be situated within a growing body of storytelling
research (for an elaborate overview of this literature see, for example,
Boyce, 1996). I understand by “story” a report about an event, a situa-
tion, a little world, as seen through the eyes of the storytellers who
report about their relations with an object or objects in that world
(Hummel, 1991). Stories do not merely recount events. They are the
products of severe editing. As such they are inventions rather than dis-
coveries (Weick, 1995). Storytellers are not concerned with “facts-as-
information” but with “facts-as-experience”, turning every-day expe-
rience into meaningful stories. In doing so, the storytellers neither
accept nor reject “reality”. Instead they seek to mould it in a distinct
way (Gabriel, 1995). Stories and storytelling are not just diversion.
Stories connect facts, store complex summaries in retrievable form,
and help people comprehend complex environments (Weick and
Browning, 1986).
The storytelling literature places great importance on narrative ways of
knowing. The distinction with more traditional ways of organising reali-
ty was aptly captured by Barry and Elmes (1997b): «There are two
basic ways we, as social beings, construct and organize reality. The
logicoscientific mode seeks truth through empirical verification; its goal
is the reduction of uncertainty and its language is regulated by requi-
rements of consistency and noncontradiction. The narrative mode, in
contrast, emphasizes the creation of good stories that are contextual-
ly and temporally bound. This perspective leads not to certainties but
to kaleidoscopic understandings.» (Barry and Elmes, 1997b, p. 847)2.
Fisher’s work (e.g. 1984; 1985) is referenced consistently in the story-
telling literature (e.g. Boje, 1991; Boyce, 1996; Weick and Browning,
1986). He is credited with coining the term “narrative paradigm” which
encompasses various narrative ways of organising reality. Within the
narrative paradigm people are portrayed as meditative as well as cal-
culative thinkers who judge the reasoning in stories by how well the
story hangs together and how fully it rings true with experience. The
meaning and value of a story are always a matter of how it stands with
or against other stories. There is no story that is not embedded in other
stories. One considers not the truth per se of the stories, but the conse-
quences of accepting them as truth after a determination of their truth
qualities as assessed by the tests of narrative probability and narrati-
ve fidelity3 (Fisher, 1985).
If organisations are “webs of meaning” (Geertz, 1973) then no one can
stand outside those webs. The researcher, or any other “expert” for
that matter, is a storyteller just like everyone else4. No matter how
strictly a case is argued, it will always be a story, an interpretation of
some aspect of the world which is historically and culturally grounded
and shaped by human personality (Weick and Browning, 1986).
Czarniawska (1997, p. 26) pointed out that while «narratives on orga-
nisations» (the traditional ways of writing about organisations) are
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2. Butler (1997) makes very much the
same point when he contrasts the essential
difference between stories and experiments
as a basis for empirical social inquiry.
3. Narrative probability refers to formal
features of a story conceived as a discrete
sequence of thought and/or action in life or
literature; it concerns the question of whe-
ther a story hangs together. Narrative fide-
lity concerns the “truth qualities” of the
story, the degree to which it accords with
the logic of good reasons: the soundness of
its reasoning and the value of its values
(Fisher, 1985).
4. Instead of discovering enduring facts of
organisational life and reporting them
through neutral description, the researcher
actively creates truth by assigning meaning
to the phenomena he or she observes and
experiences. It thus becomes difficult to
conceive of any possibility of an “accura-
te” or even an “impartial” representation
of “organisational reality”. In the very act
of constructing data out of experience, the
researcher singles out some things as wor-
thy of note and relegates others to the
background, thus eliminating any possibili-
ty of providing “pure” description, some-
times referred to light-heartedly as “imma-
culate perception” (Wolcott, 1994).
usually stylised in the «only true story» format, «narratives in organi-
sations» are manifold. The storytelling research tries to preserve this
plurality. The kaleidoscopic aspect of storytelling research can be wit-
nessed in many examples of this literature. In what follows I provide a
very brief selection.
Martin (1990) deconstructs and reconstructs an organisational story of
a mere six lines from a feminist point of view. She explores how appa-
rently well-intentioned organisational practices can reify, rather than
alleviate, gender inequalities. Barry and Elmes (1997a) take a narrati-
ve view of strategy. They investigate how tellings of strategy funda-
mentally influence strategic choice and action and highlight the discur-
sive, social nature of the strategy project, linking it to cultural and his-
torical contexts. Boje (1991) offers a first-hand observation of storytel-
ling as it is performed naturally in an organisation. His work draws
attention to the uses of storytelling by internal and external stakehol-
ders and to the dynamics which vary story performance. These stake-
holders posit alternative stories with alternative motives and implica-
tions to the very same underlying historical incident. In his study of the
discourses surrounding the Disney corporation Boje (1995) traces the
ways in which the official and the nonofficial accounts play with the
same story elements but come away with very different readings and
then analyses the relationship of the nonofficial accounts to the domi-
nant legend of an official, happy, and profitable organisation. All stories
about Disney are found to cover up a great deal of ambiguity. Boje
concludes that: «Organizations cannot be registered as one story, but
instead are a multiplicity, a plurality of stories and story interpretations
in struggle with one another… More important, organizational life is
more indeterminate, more differentiated, more chaotic, than it is
simple, systematic, monological, and hierarchical.» (p. 1001).
The analysis of the reengineering movement by Boje, Rosile, Dennehy
and Summers (1997) is perhaps of greatest direct relevance to this
paper. Boje and co-workers deconstruct the concept of reengineering as
found in Hammer and Champy’s (1993) text and tapes from Hammer’s
“performances” at management seminars and pull out the storytelling
aspects in the BPR discourse. Hammer and Champy promise a set of
general principles that will reinvent companies in the postindustrial age
but what appears to be a revolution or revision is actually more of the
same, «a storyteller’s fictive revisioning of the American dream» (Boje
et al., 1997, p. 639). For example, Boje et al. (p.647) show how 19 reen-
gineering themes can be reread as bureaucratic themes.
The common theme running through these examples is that of «power-
ful storytellers propagandising their version of reality as the reality that
other storytellers are to live in5.» The authors show, often through a
deconstruction of various stories, how discourse is used to impose
power over others, and how these “hegemonic discourses” can be
opened up to various readings. In this sense all the authors build on
Lyotard’s (1984) concept of the “grand narrative” as totalising account.
In considering the impact of the TQM/BPR discourse in the two case
organisations I will elaborate on this theme. In the case organisations
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5. A quote derived from a suggestion of
one of the referees.
senior people were asking others to live out a particular script, partial-
ly drafted by management gurus. This set in motion a whole chain of
discursive movements.
The empirical section that follows consists of two parts. The first part
contains a description of the contextual embedding of two change pro-
grammes. The second part considers the official change discourse, the
reaction of organisational members (both in terms of resistance and of
“reconstitution” of practices) and the conflicting meanings which finally
emerge from the encounter between the two. It will take the form of a
mix of interpretation and mini-stories by organisational actors. I will try
to represent the local hodgepodge of sensemaking by quoting some of
the voices of the actors involved. Inevitably, I will have to impose a cer-
tain formal coherence on a virtual chaos of events and interpretations.
There is no need to maintain the illusion that “those people” talk for
themselves; indeed they do not (cf. Czarniawska, 1997). But at least I
try to pay them a compliment by making the reader clearly aware of the
fact that there are different languages being spoken. Representation is
ultimately always self-presentation. Even when we allow others to
speak, when we talk about or for them, we are taking over their voice
(Denzin, 1994). Not an ideal situation, but as Martin argued: «It is dif-
ficult to imagine how to give up the author-ity game, without reducing
the researcher to the role of a secretary or a publisher.» (Martin, 1992,
p.201).
EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS
«The adventures first,» said the Gryphon in an impatient tone: «expla-
nations take such a dreadful time.» (Carroll 1865/1982, p.95).
The empirical findings represented here are based on a research inter-
vention over the period 1992-1994 in two divisions of two large British
manufacturing organisations: Pilkington Insulation Ltd. and British
Nuclear Fuels - Fuel Division. These divisions will be referred to in this
paper as PIL and BNFL. The intervention was concerned with the
study of the introduction of the latest concrete manifestations of plan-
ned organisational change: TQM (Total Quality Management) and
BPR (Business Process Reengineering). These approaches were des-
cribed at the time as the two latest expressions of an increasing
sophistication in management techniques and principles. BPR was
introduced in BNFL under the label “rightsizing”, in PIL the CATS
(Competitive Advantage Through Service) programme was based on
the BPR principles and philosophy. The TQM and BPR inspired chan-
ge programmes were introduced chronologically in the case compa-
nies (roughly separated by a 3-year time gap) and were represented
as distinct change approaches in the official change discourse.
However, I will conflate the TQM and BPR constructs when I talk about
“TQM/BPR discourse” in my interpretation, as I see these constructs
as part of a hegemonic discourse that tries to sell a particular story of
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organisational reality6. In any case, the conceptual distinction propo-
sed in the official change discourse was not shared throughout the
organisation. Most of the data used to build a picture of the introduc-
tion of planned change programmes were derived either from semi-
structured interviews or company documents: 35 managers were inter-
viewed in PIL and 41 in BNFL. The interviews covered people in mana-
gerial roles at various hierarchical levels and various departments in
the divisions.
CONTEXTUAL EMBEDDING OF THE CHANGE
PROGRAMMES
Economic reality, resulting in the perceived need to «increase organi-
sational effectiveness and efficiency in order to ensure survival in an
increasingly competitive market7», formed a powerful driver for insti-
gating change in both case companies. The link between external and
internal pressures for change was provided by the discourse of senior
managers. Senior managers conceptualised the latest change pro-
grammes as the expression of an increasing sophistication in mana-
ging change («building on what we’ve already achieved»). The chan-
ge programmes were presented/explained as a way to ensure the ulti-
mate survival of the organisation, reduce internal inefficiencies, and
involve people more in the working of the organisation. Consultants
played a significant role in both case companies in establishing the ini-
tial conceptualisation of the change programmes by senior manage-
ment. This conceptualisation involved moving the organisation from its
present state to a future, more desirable state and was underpinned by
the journey metaphor8. Frustrations created by the existing organisa-
tional set-up with its old rules and rigid departmental structures (i.e.
dissatisfaction with the status quo, «we cannot keep running our orga-
nisation this way») were fully exploited in this discourse.
Economic pressures for change in BNFL Fuel Division identified by
senior managers included: the disappearing market for Fuel Division’s
main product (Magnox), the privatisation of the electricity industry (and
the accompanying move from cost-plus to fixed price contracts), and
increasing international competition. When TQM was introduced
(1990) these economic difficulties could be foreseen but were not yet
tangible in day-to-day activities. The main perceived driver behind
rightsizing was the demand of Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear to
bring prices for nuclear fuel down by 20%. This translated into a 20%
or more reduction in the workforce. Although rightsizing was partly ini-
tiated by the desire to grasp organisational problems at their root,
something which TQM seemed to be unable to achieve, the main dri-
ving force behind the initiative was beyond any doubt external.
Apart from these economic pressures, BNFL was not immune to the
politics surrounding the nuclear industry in the UK. A less explicit, but
very forceful driver in Fuel Division, was the need to “look good” and
thus be considered as a candidate for privatisation when Nuclear
Electric and Scottish Nuclear would cut their ties with the government.
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7. A phrase pulled from the PIL newletter
(Summer, 1990)
8. «TQM is like starting on a road that
goes on forever. TQM will never end for
any of us. We will always be asking:
“What are the next steps we should be
taking?”» (The BNFL quality handbook,
1990, p.39).
«We are on a long journey of continuous
improvement…» (PIL newsletter, Autumn
1991).
6. I am aware that in doing so I am impli-
citly taking a stance against the official
change discourse.
Managers in Fuel Division saw themselves as the most progressive in
the whole of the UK group. The desire to keep up this image of being
in touch with the latest developments in management thinking consti-
tuted a further driving force to start the TQM and rightsizing change
programmes.
Frustrations about demarcations (both vertical and horizontal) exerted
a strong pressure for change and were fully exploited during the intro-
duction of the TQM programme. The demarcation was apparent at
managerial level in strong departmentalism and clear hierarchical dis-
tinctions. There also existed strong demarcations at shop floor level
(e.g. the different “trades”). TQM and rightsizing were explicitly concei-
ved as a way to replace the old rules («keep your head down and do
as you are told», empire building) by new ones (challenge things, get
involved, «we are all in this together»).
PIL had been operating in a far more competitive environment than
BNFL and had faced harsh trading conditions since 1989. Even within
the Pilkington group, PIL was perceived as being «at the sharp end of
things». Prices of its main products had fallen by 60% (adjusted for
inflation) between 1988 and 1993 as PIL struggled to maintain its mar-
ket share. Jobs had been cut mercilessly in order to survive. Economic
pressures had been a major driver in the introduction of the change
programmes.
Internal drivers for change in PIL were a reaction to very similar pro-
blems which had been identified in the 1969 Productivity Programme
in the Pilkington group: working relationships which were stifling any
initiative (demarcation), wasteful practices and lack of involvement of
employees. The internal drive for CATS seemed to have been twofold:
a frustration with TQM that it did not «deliver the goods» and the desi-
re of the new CEO to make an impression on the organisation. The
CATS programme initially also benefited from the contrast with the
inaction of TQM (e.g. by building on existing dissatisfaction with TQM).
PIL directors took pride in being at the forefront of management thin-
king and were quick to take up any new developments in the manage-
ment field. PIL was generally considered to be a “social laboratory” for
the rest of the Pilkington group. The need to keep up this image of
being a front-runner (a main driving force behind the introduction of the
change programmes) was partly due to the fact that PIL was not a core
business for the Pilkington group and therefore could be abandoned at
any time. Later events proved that this fear was not unfounded9.
INTERPRETING THE CHANGE DISCOURSE
The mini stories provided here should give the reader a «flavour of the
politics of language played out in a discursive field10». The aim is not
to use them to “prove” my interpretation is the only possible one.
Nevertheless, I believe it is important that the reader gets some insight
in what kind of language was used by the various organisational
actors. I decided on a textual strategy of keeping the interpretation and
quotes pertaining to particular assertions separate (rather than illus-
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9. In June 1994 PIL was sold to the
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation.
10. A suggestion by one of the reviewers
on how to restructure the first draft of the
paper. The vague descriptions of manage-
rial positions after the quotes are a compro-
mise between the need to give some indica-
tion of the speaker’s hierarchical position
while protecting his/her anonimity.
trating every assertion with some quote or other) in order not to play
the puppeteer too much. Although the order I impose here over the
chaotic is largely artificial, the quotes are not and should bring the sec-
tion to life. My order takes the form of three movements: the imposi-
tion/introduction of a hegemonic discourse, the resistance to this dis-
course, and the appropriation of the discourse by organisational actors
to reconstitute their actions and those of senior management. At the
very least, this representation should provide a kaleidoscopic unders-
tanding of the phenomenon of “resistance to change”. Conventionally
this resistance is interpreted as psychological backwardness (usually
attributed to people at the lower levels of the hierarchy) and senior
managers are often encouraged to be relentless in responding to resis-
tance11. Once we step outside the hegemonic discourse, “resistance”
becomes the right to question the ideas that are presented as unavoi-
dable. The result may be a rejection or an appropriation, a translation
of the hegemonic discourse for one’s own purposes (Czarniawska,
1997). In a final interpretative move I summarise the dominant and
marginalised meanings temporarily co-existing, thus undermining the
idea of any permanent order.
IMPOSITION OF A HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE
«It seems to me that your power is a hidden power, because people
only think of you as communicating reality, but in communicating rea-
lity, you construct reality.» (Hines, 1988, p.257).
The TQM and BPR discourse can be seen in part as a reflection of the
necessity for large corporations to find new and innovative ways of
competing constructively, of managing fragmented workforces and
facilitating their survival in threatening circumstances (Kerfoot and
Knights, 1995). It allows the organisation to tell itself as a coherent,
centred, and strategically organised set of arrangements (Law, 1994).
The discourse of TQM and BPR is powerful partly because it is made
to appear complete and neutral, thus hiding the tensions and incom-
pletion. It emerges and assumes the mantle of common sense, as a
new normality that subsumes that which came before (Knights and
Murray, 1994). In espousing the TQM/BPR discourse organisational
members can gain status and specific identities, but they also re-enact
a dominant set of power relations (Deetz, 1998). What is good for the
company is supposed to be perceived by employees as being good for
them (Keenoy, 1997). TQM/BPR is presented as “the only way to be”
if the organisation is to survive and jobs to be preserved.
«I am sure we are like any other organisation in that you think that you
know what TQM is but it is only when you get further and further into it
that you realise how big it is and the way it interacts with the business.
TQM was seen as an umbrella initiative 4 years ago. The level that we
are at now is that we see it as an integral part of the business process,
an operating philosophy. We are at a stage where continuous impro-
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11. Boje et al. (1997, p. 655) dig out a
nice quote from Hammer in this respect:
«Let them buck, let them speak up, then
break the colt down.»
vement is genuinely recognised as a necessity. It is now also built into
our strategic and business plans. TQM has come of age. We unders-
tand what it means now. We understand what we need to do to be
world class. What we need to do is prioritise and focus tightly on the
critical areas which are going to advance us on the world class lad-
der.» (senior manager, BNFL).
«The philosophy and techniques of TQM have helped to overcome the
inertia of this massive project [building of a new plant]. We tended to
become more focused on giving people a better service, talk to other
parts of the division. We had personal contracts with R&D where they
promised to deliver us the goods by certain dates. And people took
pride in working to achieve that.» (senior manager, BNFL).
«It’s the only way to be. If you’re not in the club you’re dead.» (senior
manager PIL).
«There is the outward image you would like to give if someone asks
you at a senior level whether you agree with TQM; you are likely to say
yes. Because if you say no..., it's a bit like the emperor's new clothes,
it's incorrect from a career point of view.» (middle manager, BNFL).
I had some first hand experience of the operation of hegemonic ten-
dencies during my research intervention. When presenting my mate-
rial to senior managers in BNFL the research findings were treated
very defensively. Concern was expressed that my findings were over-
ly negative. The apprehension which was expressed by most intervie-
wees was brushed aside as «hat will be very easy to overcome» (sic).
Contradictions and deviating opinions were eloquently explained away.
Even the managers I had interviewed and found very willing to discuss
all sorts of problems displayed a totally different behaviour pattern in
this final meeting. Eventually it was decided to extract four or five key
issues from my research report and to «BNFL-ise» (sic) them. In effect
this meant: fit it in with the official company discourse. Although I had
informally agreed to make a series of presentations to lower level
managers, this offer was now diplomatically turned down (something
which had been predicted by one of the line managers)12.
RESISTANCE TO THE TQM/BPR DISCOURSE
Narratives are necessarily incomplete. Their attempts to tell and embo-
dy arrangements tend to encounter resistances (Law, 1994).
Organisational members are not simply passive agents, easily sedu-
ced by the TQM/BPR discourse (Parker, 1997). They quickly call atten-
tion to inconsistencies between the assumptions that the change dis-
course espouses and the historical patterns of authority relations that
they have experienced (Wilkinson, Godfrey, and Marchington, 1997).
For example, in the case companies actions taken under the TQM
label reflected the same structure of power that the TQM discourse
was ostensibly meant to challenge and change. The TQM discourse
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12. Boyce (1995, p.126) relates a similar
incident while examining collective sense-
making and storytelling at a non-profit
organisation. When the themes and stories
emerging in the study did not confirm the
president’s desired direction, the study
became invisible.
and its concerns with trust, commitment and “having the right attitude”,
seemed in direct contradiction with its actual introduction and its
effects on the organisational members.
In BNFL the change directive arrived as a fait accompli, with little
reflection of local concerns, dissent, or alternative views. As the chan-
ge process unfolded, many of the old cultural rules tended to corrupt
the new rules. For example, “playing the TQM game” became a new
way of empire building; managers who wanted promotion had to be
“seen” to support TQM. Expectations of operational managers were
that vertical demarcations would become less pronounced (and they
did to some extent) but many were disappointed by the perceived com-
mitment shown by colleagues, senior managers and the director. To
many TQM had become part of the political games that were played in
the organisation and was no longer seen as way to make BNFL a bet-
ter organisation. Apathy set in. Although in the official change discour-
se rightsizing was presented as a way of delivering the drastic
changes TQM failed to produce, in practice the programme was per-
ceived by operational managers as being driven by external consti-
tuencies (i.e. the need to cut costs by at least 20% by any means). This
led to extreme apprehension which undermined the programme. This
apprehension was further amplified by people's anxiety about their
employment prospects in the “rightsized” BNFL.
«TQM was wonderfully done [ironic]. “We are going to become a bet-
ter organisation, therefore you will love TQM, whether you like it or
not”. There was a video from the chief executive “I am determined that
we are going to become a better organisation; we are going to partici-
pate [slams fist on table]”. Not: “I have the desire” or “we would like you
to…” The words were awful. Whoever sanctioned that video should
have been shot... It sent us a terrible message. No vision about it, com-
pletely top down, no input, no ownership…» (middle manager, BNFL).
«People have been asked to join teams and are reluctant to do so
because they don't feel they are getting anywhere. It takes up a tre-
mendous amount of time to move a small step. There is the perception
there is a lot of fuss about nothing. They formalised it, got people's
photographs everywhere; that somehow justifies the time, money, and
effort it has taken to do this. I was a sturdy follower of TQM for a long
time. I initiated a lot of quality improvement teams and even I now think
“Why are we bothering?” We seem to be driven into doing something.
That is where the problem lies. It is almost as if we are driven to make
changes for the sake of making changes rather than living with the fact
that people are going to make changes in their own area in their own
time.» (middle manager, BNFL).
«People leaving and not being replaced, is that rightsizing?» (ironic
voice - junior manager, BNFL).
In PIL a significant number of employees had come to believe there
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was a necessary link between the TQM programme and job reductions
and thus many rejected all proposed changes under the TQM banner.
They referred to two major redundancy rounds coinciding with the
implementation of TQM. Furthermore, since the same work had to be
done by far less people, managers became subject to a lot of additio-
nal pressure. Consequently they resented having to spend time on
issues that they perceived as not directly related to “doing the job” (e.g.
TQM meetings). TQM then became «the damn thing that had to be
done». Furthermore, any changes which required a considerable
amount of resources (either money or manpower) were not made
because all resources needed to be focused on the day-to-day survi-
val. This constraint was most apparent in the allocation of resources.
Only a particular type of change —small, efficiency improvements
which did not require any up-front investment— was possible on a
recurrent and reliable basis. Inevitably, the TQM discourse tended to
get trivialised.
Many managers made sense of TQM by using the experiences of the
old change programmes (these were framed negatively, i.e. trumpet
celebrations and no changes in actual working practices). Under the
CATS label changes were introduced and implemented at great pace.
However, over time doubts began to surface about the value of the
CATS programme. An elite had been created (PIL managers who were
working closely with the consultants) and all managers were put under
a great amount of pressure. Some clearly expressed the feeling they
were «being pushed around». This made many managers very appre-
hensive about the whole exercise. Doubts had begun to surface
concerning the value and sincerity of the CATS programme at the end
of my research intervention.
«TQM, continuous improvement, we have got to give a better service,
and yet our resources are cut again and again. Fundamentally, that is
the contradiction we have got. People certainly think they are tight on
time and therefore have not the time and resources to do what the
organisation says we are doing: TQM, spending time to get it right.»
(senior manager PIL).
«I believe the managers need to stand up for themselves a bit more to
the directors. The middle management are getting squeezed in bet-
ween the staff and directors. I see a lot of our conditions are changing,
at the stroke of a pen, without consultations: this is it guys.» (middle
manager, PIL).
«We had these TQM story sheets. A couple of those were wrong. I say
that quite confidently. The conclusions drawn from these TQM initia-
tives were incorrect from a scientific point of view. That is the sort of
daft things we were doing. Trying to impress people with success sto-
ries. One was about labelling in the warehouse. It was said that becau-
se of TQM the number of errors had gone down. The evidence clearly
showed that with the introduction of the new scheme the number of
M@n@gement, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1998, 1-22
11
errors had gone up. You don’t need many of those before you say: this
is all wrong.» (middle manager, PIL).
APPROPRIATION OF THE TQM/ BPR DISCOURSE
Dominant discourses are totalising only for those who view them as
such; they are replete with fissures within which people engage in their
individual practices of sensemaking. Organisational actors will try to
appropriate the discourse, translate it for their own needs, “authorise”
it as it were (cf. Czarniawska, 1997). Thus the change discourse
becomes a double-edged sword whereby operational managers can
“reconstitute” their practices and those of senior management as much
as senior management could do the same to operational managers. If
senior managers talk about working within a TQM philosophy, then
there is an opening for their subordinates to represent themselves and
their superiors within the same logic (Parker, 1997; Wilkinson et al.,
1997). It then no longer is a question of being for or against TQM/BPR.
The issue becomes: How do the different parties involved reshape
their interests in the context of TQM/BPR (Munro, 1995)? For example,
buying into the change discourse can be a possible way of signalling
to those with the power to promote that managers are not averse to
change, but that while they are prepared to look critically at the system
in which they work, they will not unduly rock the organisational boat
(Huczynski, 1993). Of course, there is no guarantee that this strategy
will necessarily work to an individual’s advantage.
«TQM got me a promotion… You'll notice that wherever you go, whe-
rever there is a TQM co-ordinator, there has evolved a little empire,
someone got a promotion out of it.» (middle manager, BNFL).
«People belittle TQM but the way they work is within the TQM philo-
sophy anyway. They say: “Why call it TQM? We’ve always done that”.
I’ve never come across anyone saying “We’re not doing it because it
is TQM”. Teamworking, taking responsibility for their own quality is
seen by people as the normal way to work.» (middle manager, BNFL).
«For example, there was a TQM lunch scheduled by one of our direc-
tors so that he could speak to a wide variety of people. Now the date
has been moved back. Unfortunately people predicted that this would
happen. They feel a bit let down and wonder “Is that what TQM is
about?”. It is the same with cutting down costs. We are saying to
people “you can't just use as many pencils as you want” and then you
see someone in a more senior position having a grand lunch somew-
here or travel first class... It is not essential but people feel there are
different rules that apply for different people and that undermines
TQM. TQM then becomes a very easy label to blame things or people.
Instead of the individual, TQM gets the slant.» (middle manager, PIL).
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«I know people find me a pain at times but I have always tried to do as
near a perfect job as I could. TQM therefore was absolutely superb. I
thought “great, at last somebody else is going to do the same sort of
things”. There were all sorts of problems in R&D at the time and I tried
to get things put right. As a result of that I got branded as 'incomplete'
and had a salary cut. You conclude what you like from that. Obviously
it is only me who says so but I genuinely tried to do something about
things under the banner of TQM and that is what happened.» (middle
manager, PIL).
«CATS was an opportunity for us to show to the board how important
we are in the organisation providing computer services.» (junior mana-
ger, PIL).
«People did not take other people seriously when they were trying to
do something about it [organisational problems]. One could quote a
hundred examples which prove that the board did not really unders-
tand what it was about and what the consequences of it were.» (midd-
le manager, PIL).
OUTCOMES: A CONFUSING AND CONTESTED
SET OF MEANINGS
The discourse promulgated by the senior management became
increasingly irrelevant as a significant number of operational managers
saw it as «high flying language» which had very few connections with
the day-to-day work. The meaning attached to outcomes and events
as managers made sense of actions, or lack of these, by colleagues
and the top team became increasingly inconsistent with the company
message. As the official change discourse tried to control actors’ sen-
semaking, it effectively marginalised alternative meanings attached to
outcomes, issues, and events and got progressively more out of touch
with lived organisational experiences. Eventually this discourse would
be stretched to breaking point. The way the companies coped was
eventually to drop a particular change discourse (the TQM discourse)
in favour of a new discourse which promised to alleviate all the exis-
ting problems (rightsizing or CATS discourse). However, towards the
end of the research intervention this “new” discourse had generated
just as many alternative meanings among organisational members.
Tables 1 and 2 contain some examples of the “official” view on cer-
tain issues and cultural rules and the requisite alternative meanings
attached to these same issues and cultural rules.
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13. The reader may have noticed that I
already incorporated some reviewers’
comments in this text (see footnotes 5 and
10). Of course, most of the reviewers’
comments are of no direct interest to the
reader (such as those concerning the lack
of focus, theoretical basis, and interpreta-
tion in the first version of this paper). I
limit myself to those comments I believe a
reader might offer him/herself. The metho-
dological reflections on “voice” offered
earlier in the paper still apply.
TQM is the continuous improvement in the performance of
BNFL, in meeting safely and cost effectively, agreed require-
ments of internal and external customers, by releasing the
potential of all employees.
An organisation that is extremely responsive, lean, flexible,
process oriented, customer oriented, works closely with sup-
pliers, no stocks, no lead times, empowered, highly motivated.
That is the goal.
This was not just change for change’s sake, but change which
would give enough improvement and benefit to be worth doing.
What we did was go back to fundamental questions and ask
what business have we got and if we were starting from scrat-
ch again how would we organise and run them?
I viewed rightsizing positively because it actually made us set
some positive targets for reducing our cost which we did not
have in TQM. That is what this division needs. Had it not been
for that, we would still have been fiddling at the edges.
Come up with initiatives, challenge, try and seek better ways of
doing things. If you're not happy with the answer you get from
your supervisor, go one line up. The hierarchy is not sacro-
sanct.
There is certainly the attitude that TQM is the practical alterna-
tive to work. A lot of the meetings could just be held for TQM's
sake. People who are never invited to them feel they are car-
rying the new culture, that they are doing the work, send out
the fuel to the gates to make money.
When you talk to the guys on the shop floor, they just see it as
mechanisms for spending money. They don’t see it as benefi-
cial to them.
Rightsizing is nothing more than a demanning exercise. The
intention may have been originally there to streamline the
workforce and put people in the right work but that is not how it
is perceived now.
Certain directors are settling old scores on the rightsizing. They
are targeting certain individuals and put undue pressure on
them.
Rightsizing was implemented overnight. The troops didn’t get
to know about it until the 11th hour. Are they hiding something
or does it just tend to happen that way? I’m not sure. People
are faced with a fait accompli and so experience it negatively.
The advice to get on and survive comfortably? Dead easy:
keep your head down, do your own work, stick to it, make sure
that you get plenty of paper out, follow the rules.
Stay on the right side of the right people, get your head down
and get working.
Table 1. Meanings of the TQM/Rightsizing discourse and cultural rules in BNFL
Official Meanings Alternative Meanings
DISCUSSION
«The meaning of contribution emerges not from the presentation of
brute facts, but rather from the development of honest claims to
convey knowledge intended for academic audiences.» (Locke and
Golden-Biddle, 1997, p.1026).
The aim of this last section is to pull together some key themes and to
convey what sense I make of the magnificent muddle I have presen-
ted so far. I will refer explicitly to several of the reviewers’ comments in
this discussion. Organisational tales can be told in many ways and dif-
ferent readers can potentially unlock different narratives from the same
text. As the reviewers have contributed significantly in shaping the par-
ticular story I am telling about my field experiences, I decided to give
them some kind of “voice” in the paper. They are the best substitute for
a reader the author has to work with, thus allowing me to engage in at
least something which approaches a real discussion13. The cynical
reader may see this, with some justification, as part of a rhetorical strate-
gy to support the validity of my story (cf. Locke and Golden-Biddle, 1997).
This section is structured around two different suggestions/objections
of reviewers. A first objection forces me to confront the “use-value” of
my interpretation: why did I not provide an analysis that is of immedia-
te help to managers? Two subtly different interpretations from the
reviewers will then lead into a grounded appraisal of the TQM/BPR
rhetorics. In this final part I will also indicate how I conceive of the
“contribution” of my text.
A “USELESS” INTERPRETATION?
«You need to forget trying to find solutions to problems of TQM in the
writings of text analysts, and look at the organizational learning litera-
ture for why some interventions succeed and fail.» (reviewer 2, revi-
sion1).»
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Once the TQM had started you found people far more willing to
sit around the table and solve a problem mutually. There are
very definite changes as far as that is concerned. The TQM is
on-going and although it is a very gradual change in culture it
is there, although it has had its highs and lows.
It is more alive now than it has been for the last year.
TQM will give the company an advantage over its competitors
so we can stay in business.
To make us an efficient company, save money. Also enhance
our reputation with the customers and involve people more in
the workings of the company.
The CATS project particularly, it has challenged the way people
work. CATS delivered what TQM promised to achieve.
It's a fairly open style. Reasonably informal, with quite a lot of
space given without necessarily reinforcing that that space is
given. There is very little in this organisation that if you want to
do it, people actually stop you from doing it.
Don't be afraid of challenging what you do. There are very few
pockets in the organisation that would resent challenge.
It just never came into being really. Everybody went on
courses, got the literature, notices everywhere... but I don't
think it made an impact on people. There was no connection
with the daily work.
Practical consequences? None whatsoever. It degenerated
from very fine philosophical principles to a cartoon on the noti-
ce board they churned out once a week.
Many of the work force see it as the route to further job reduc-
tions - and we have lost 35% of our work force over the past
two years.
The ideals of it are wonderful but in reality they are very hard
to achieve. “People are your most important asset” is an awk-
ward thing to say when in the same breath we got rid of
people.
There were all these good ideas supposedly coming out of the
CATS project. We had suggested those many years ago but no
one had given them any backing. An outside group of people
comes in led by a couple of people from within our organisa-
tion and suddenly work is getting done… I think it is a question
of who is taking the credit?
Even if you know about certain things that are key issues to
the company and should be spoken about at a senior level I
would be very careful about how to do that. You don't just
speak out. If you want to get on you must be afraid of upsetting
the apple cart.
To get on? Do as you are told and don't rock the boat. I'm
sorry but I'm absolutely dead serious on that.
Table 2. Meanings of the TQM/CATS discourse and cultural rules in PIL
Official Meanings Alternative Meanings
Because my unit of analysis is not the change project itself, but the dis-
course surrounding it, many organisational issues may fade in the
background. The particular problem with the ambiguous picture I have
sketched is that it does not really provide what the market wants
(cf. Deetz, 1995). Because people (managers especially) want simple
solutions and explanations there is a pressure to provide them. Hence
the tendency to produce texts which limit concepts to those with which
one particular social group is ideologically comfortable or to those
which highlight only the variables which are easily manipulable by
managerial interests (Watson, 1994). In particular managers want to
know the exact reasons why change interventions succeed or fail. But
the false clarity that results when bowing to “market pressures” is often
part and parcel of the dominant discourse, the discourse of those who
think everything goes without saying (Bourdieu, 1990).
A practical problem in looking for clearly delineated causes of success
or failure is that it is hard to know why, when, and if a change attempt
has failed, precisely because of the many competing discourses. The
inability to successfully transform an organisation may be attributable
to a multitude of factors and there are no hard and fast standards for
assessing the results of a change programme. One can always point
to some positive developments and ascribe them to an intervention,
even when the organisation as a whole is worse off for it (Miller,
Greenwood, and Hinnings, 1997). The key participants in any change
process have an elementary interest in portraying the costly process
as a worthwhile and successful endeavour (Kieser, 1997). These diffi-
culties are further exacerbated by the propaganda image of TQM and
BPR in the popular press which implies that, as success is nearly uni-
versal, difficulties must be related to the exceptional obstructiveness or
inadequacy of some of the parties involved locally (Ramsay, 1996).
Incidentally, both PIL and BNFL were identified by the DTI
(Department of Trade and Industry) as “best practice” companies in
the area of TQM. Apparently they were managing quite well within the
context of British industry. At the very least, external constituencies
were impressed. However, the companies faced the same tensions
which are widely reported in the organisational literature and which
remain unresolved for the vast majority of companies who engage in a
culture change programme. For example, how is the demand for conti-
nuously higher performance to be reconciled with the ideal of team-
work (Gergen and Whitney, 1996), teamwork and increased flexibility
with “voluntary” redundancies (De Cock, 1998), empowerment with the
increased routinisation of tasks (Boje and Winsor, 1993), cost-cutting
with quality enhancement (Legge, 1995)? This very much raises the
question whether culture change programmes are the most appropria-
te means of securing organisational change (Keenoy, 1997; Legge,
1995)? It is an issue I will address in the final part.
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO A GROUNDED CRITIQUE OF THE
TQM/BPR RHETORICS
«Maybe it is not an image of propaganda, but propaganda is the chan-
ge strategy in effect, to enhance careers, in these feudal kingdoms.»
(reviewer 1, revision 1).
«While the rhetoric is anti-bureaucracy, the design puts in place an
even more bureaucratic (top down), mechanistic (one best procedure
and process designed in), and certainly less democratic design…»
(reviewer 1, revision 2).
«How are TQM and BPR these kind of [totalising] discourses?… On
the face of it they seem anything but totalizing in that they engender
open-hearted resistance and criticism that is held in check not by the
discourses but by the power structure and the implicit threat of unem-
ployment or demotion. So, I was not convinced that discourse is tota-
lizing anything or dominating or hegemonizing.» (reviewer 2, revi-
sion 2).
Despite the lip service paid to issues such as “empowerment” and
“teamwork”, the change initiatives tended to be imposed as totalising
solutions in the case organisations. The mini-stories put into doubt
whether the celebration of “empowerment” and “teamwork” under the
TQM or BPR umbrella can be fully reconciled with the lived experien-
ce of employees if they simultaneously encounter a reduction in their
job security and an intensification in the pace and pressures of their
work (cf. Willmott, 1995). However, I am rather hesitant to point to
some Machiavellian plot or a «capitalist schema of alienation, dehu-
manization, and totalitarianism» (Steingard and Fitzgibbons, 1993,
p.32) behind the TQM/BPR discourse. Power/politics issues are part of
the fabric of organisational life in our late 20th century capitalist socie-
ty and not a set of actions and behaviours which can be simply brac-
keted or reified (for example, by pointing a finger at the evils of TQM).
The TQM/BPR discourses, as used by senior managers, to a great
extent reproduce rather than transform power relations which conti-
nuously confront organisational actors (De Cock, 1998).
Of course, the TQM/BPR discourse has political consequences in that
some organisational actors potentially stand to loose and others to
gain from it. But it is not all that clear who are the powerful «who seem
to be able to define the story of others for others» (to use a quote from
one of the reviewers again). All organisational actors are “disciplined”
by the change discourse to some extent. Certainly, by virtue of their
position senior managers have more opportunities to propagandise
their version of reality, «to define the story of others for others». But
even senior managers are limited in what they can and cannot do. As
argued earlier, there is no story that is not embedded in other stories,
and the TQM/BPR story lines are embedded in more macro-stories of
the changes in industry and economic life. Organisations have to be
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seen to be adopting the latest change discourse to demonstrate their
legitimacy and rationality to significant others in the environment, even
if their senior managers are not convinced of the value of this discour-
se. If senior managers do not appear to use the latest change dis-
course, then external stakeholders’ expectations that the organisation
is run rationally will tend to be disappointed, and stakeholders may
withdraw their support from the organisation, thereby increasing the
likelihood that the organisation and its managers will fail (Abrahamson,
1996). In this way all organisational actors are “disciplined” by the glo-
bal change discourse.
Policy makers need to develop a coherent and plausible local discour-
se in response to these global discourses. They need to envisage an
alternative way of institutional functioning, and this can be done only if
they can articulate an alternative mission and establish an alternative
discourse in terms of which reforms may be contemplated. In this sense
«Ideological hegemony, far from being pernicious…, is a necessary
prerequisite for challenging the status quo» (Tsoukas and Papoulias,
1996, p.861). The problem with discourses such as TQM/BPR is that
they are generic discourses and therefore difficult to link to actual prac-
tices in a straightforward way. In order for the TQM/BPR discourse to
embody local practices, a sensitivity to the parochial forms of reality that
terms such as multi-functional teams, continuous improvement, empo-
werment, and the like sustain has to be developed (cf. Gergen and
Thatchenkery, 1996). Many managers and change agents realise that
they should not follow Deming’s, Crosby’s or Hammer’s rules religious-
ly but is very difficult to break free of the TQM/BPR discourse precisely
because it has been presented as natural, all-pervasive, “the only way
to be”. Perhaps some kind of hegemonic discourse is an inevitable first
step to introduce change, but it is debatable whether a generic hege-
monic discourse is the best starting point.
Organisational actors’ understandings reside, first and foremost, in the
practices in which they participate. Therefore, there will always exist an
important asymmetry between the rules-as-represented (for example,
in the TQM discourse) and the rules-as-guide-in-practice, the latter
being far richer (Tsoukas, 1996). Thus the three movements of hege-
mony-resistance-constitution will surface in all organisations to a grea-
ter or lesser extent, leading to the ambiguous sensemaking I tried to
capture in the mini-stories. The comment from reviewer 2 that the
TQM/BPR discourses do not seem to totalise anything in practice (i.e.
in PIL and BNFL) is correct. However, this does not mean that the
BPR/TQM discourse is not totalising/hegemonic in its basic intent. The
discourse very much tries to forcefully “sell” (supported by videos,
seminars, and glossy brochures) a particular version of organisational
reality14. It is just that, for better or for worse (depending on one’s
perspective), this totalising discourse has to compete with many other
stories. What emerges ultimately is a unique combination of random
events, sectional interests and existing routines. As Martin and Frost
eloquently put it: «[T]here is no ‘happy acculturated forever after’
ending the change attempts. In all likelihood, there is no ‘forever after’
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14. As I clarified in an earlier point, this
is not necessarily unique of the TQM/BPR
discourse. This discourse is just the latest
forum in which organisational power
games are being played out.
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in the script. At best, there may be some combination of agreement,
dispute, and confusion that can be stitched together by human agen-
cy, as managers and others move the action along, accomplish some
objective, and then regroup around subsequent problems, issues, and
opportunities.» (Martin and Frost, 1996, p.614).
Managers who are serious about “change” will have to engage creati-
vely with the various meanings created by the imposition of the hege-
monic/monologic discourse and reflect on the dynamic unfolding of
concrete interactions within a particular socio-temporal context, which
should result in the acceptance of some kind of polyphony. Thus the
hegemonic discourse would have to disappear or mutate over time if it
is to have some lasting impact on organisational practices. The purely
managerial interpretation and storytelling of the organisation and the
world around it (the grand narrative) will have to be supplemented with
local stories. These stories will not be decided upon by senior mana-
gers and consultants. Thus the organisational storytelling should beco-
me richer over time and go beyond the well-rehearsed script of saying
something «about record profits due to a dramatically shortened cycle
time and include great things employees have to say about the
changes.» (Boje et al., 1997, p.655). The immediate implication is that
any change process is more dynamic and recursive than the traditio-
nal linear or stage models with their underlying journey metaphor
imply. These models which permeate the practitioners’ literature do not
explain anything other than the order they try to prescribe in the first
place. So if readers get away with the feeling that stage models are
totally self-referential, see them for what they are (part of the popular
consultants’ script), that would be at least one simple take-away pro-
duct of this article.
Within a narrative approach the differences between story lines are at
least as informative and useful as the formulation of an overarching
account (Barry and Elmes, 1997b). Through the juxtapositioning of dif-
ferent accounts, the TQM and BPR constructs can become more
contextualised and, thereby, more imbued with meaning. Thus I hope
to have contributed to a grounded critique of the TQM and BPR dis-
courses as well as to the burgeoning literature on storytelling.
Ultimately my reflections can be only a contribution to a continuing
debate about ways of organising, rather than a contribution to our
knowledge of organisations. But most importantly… I hope you
enjoyed reading my particular story and got something useful out of it,
however you define “useful”.
Endnote: My sincerest gratitude goes out to the four reviewers for helping me to tell
my story through the various revisions. Some sections, especially those tackling story-
telling, almost could have been co-written by them. I integrated some of the reviewers’
suggestions and concerns to acknowledge their contribution to the construction of the
text. The usual disclaimers apply.
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